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Abstract:  
Following ten years of conservative rule in South Korea, the election of President Moon Jae-In 
presents an opportunity to improve its relationship with North Korea. A major architect of the 
Sunshine Policy, many of Moon’s proposed policy changes echo those of the Sunshine Policy. 
This paper will present and evaluate the merits of the Sunshine Policy, and compare them to 
Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness, the alternative presented during the governments 
of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. Finally, this paper will present the merits of a return to 
such policies of reconciliation and openness with North Korea, examining the structural factors 
leading to North Korean proliferation. 
 
Résumé : 
Après dix années de régime conservateur en Corée du Sud, l’élection du président Moon Jae-In 
est l’occasion d’améliorer ses relations avec la Corée du Nord. Grand architecte de la politique 
Sunshine, bon nombre de changements proposés par Moon font écho à ceux de la politique 
Sunshine. Ce document présentera et évaluera les mérites de la politique Sunshine, et les 
comparera à Vision 3000 : Dénucléarisation et Ouverture, l’alternative présentée pendant les 
gouvernements de Lee Myung-bak et Park Geun-hye. Enfin, ce document présentera les mérites 
d’un retour à de telles politiques de réconciliation et d’ouverture avec la Corée du Nord, en 
examinant les facteurs structurels conduisant à la prolifération nord-coréenne. 
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“Our Sunshine Policy is a truly difficult proposition. It requires 
courage and perseverance as well as faithfulness and wisdom. Our 
tasks will be many and varied. However, I firmly believe that the 
policy is the call of history. It represents the aspiration of all peoples 
and the Korean nation's only viable route to survival.”  
 
- Korean President Kim Dae-jung at 
the Jeju Peace Forum, 16 June, 20011 
 
 
Introduction 
On July 17th, 2017, the recently sworn-in government of Moon Jae-in moved for bilateral 
military talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to discuss aversion of a 
military crisis at the nation’s volatile border.2 The move comes at a time when Inter-Korean and 
Washington-Pyongyang relations are at an all-time low, and the DPRK boasts that it has recently 
tested the technology necessary to deliver a nuclear weapon across the Pacific Ocean.3 The move 
signals a major shift in Inter-Korean relations by the administration of Moon Jae-in, and a stark 
shift from the policies of conservative Park Geun-hye. Moon, a human rights lawyer and Chief of 
Staff under former-President Roh Moo-hyun,4 campaigned during the 2017 presidential election 
on a platform of “Reform and Unity”, including reviving bilateral talks with the DPRK, arguing 
that the path to Korean unification and nonproliferation on the peninsula lies within dialogue and 
economic exchange between the two regimes.5  
 
1 “Address by President Kim Dae-Jung at the Jeju Peace Forum,” Institute for National Security Strategy 15, no. 1 
(2001): 174-79. 
2 Adam Taylor, “There are 3 Big Reasons Why South Korea’s New President Wants Talks with North Korea,” The 
Washington Post, published July 17, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/17/there-are-3-big-reasons-south-koreas-new-
president-wants-talks-with-north-korea/. 
3 Ibid. 
4 S. Nathan Park, “Moon’s Secret Weapon is Sunshine,” Foreign Policy,  May 19, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/19/moons-secret-weapon-is-sunshine-south-korea-kim-jong-un/.  
5 Ibid. 
 Moon’s positions echo those of the Sunshine Policy, the set of policies directed at the 
DPRK by the Democratic governments of Kim Dae-jung (1997-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-
2008). The Sunshine Policy was outlined by President Kim Dae-jung with the stated goal of 
“improv[ing] inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation, and cooperation.”6 The 
Sunshine Policy would lead to an inter-Korean dialogue and a reduced emphasis on military 
confrontation as a means to achieve reunification. The Sunshine Policy views Korean unification 
as a process, rather than a climatic, singular objective.7 It prioritizes the establishment of peaceful 
coexistence and reconciliation, forgoing a focus on reunification until a later time. 
The Sunshine Policy was a marked break from the unification policies of conservative 
governments before and since, which have been marked by the use of the military as a deterrent 
and primary means through which unification was to be achieved. The elite of South Korean 
society are notoriously anti-communist, and therefore are distrustful of any dialogue with the 
North.8 This was evident during the past ten years of conservative rule. The presidencies of Lee 
Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye were marked by a rollback of the Sunshine Policy, and the 
obituaries of warmer inter-Korean relations were written as the North increased military tensions 
and refused to halt their nuclear weapons program.9  
Inter-Korean relations currently stand at a critical juncture, as the DPRK claim they have 
successfully conducted their first tests of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.10 At the time of 
writing, there are currently no official channels for emergency coordination between the two 
 
6 Haksoon Paik, “Assessment of the Sunshine Policy: A Korean Perspective,” Asian Perspective 26, no. 3 (2002):14. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 17. 
9 Christian Caryl, “Goodbye Sunshine,” Foreign Policy, published January 21, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/21/goodbye-sunshine/.  
10 Adam Taylor, “There are 3 Big Reasons Why South Korea’s New President Wants Talks with North Korea.”  
 
 Korean regimes,11 and the new norm shirking administration in the United States has not solidified 
its foreign policy process, nor has it filled many political appointments in the Departments of State 
or Defence.12 In seeking to rekindle many of the policies that comprised the Sunshine Policy, it is 
worth examining the record of the Policy with that of its successor. Vision 3000 was the alternative 
offered by the conservative administrations following Roh Moo-hyun’s presidency. This paper 
will lay out and evaluate the main pillars of the Sunshine Policy, as well as Vision 3000.  
This paper will take a constructivist approach in its analysis, looking closely at the 
structural factors leading to policy shifts in approaches to unification. I will argue that the Sunshine 
Policy of 1997-2003 allowed the Republic of Korea to be more proactive in its inter-Korean policy, 
allowing it to engage in a peaceful dialogue with the North, while giving the South the flexibility 
to respond resolutely to norm violations committed by the North. Further, this paper will examine 
the oft-cited claims that the DPRK is not a rational actor and argue forcefully using the 
international relations theory that the North is pursuing a rational, self-defence motivated nuclear 
policy. A resumption of the Sunshine Policy would allow Moon Jae-in the opportunity to restore 
normative diplomacy with the DPRK, ensuring that war on the Korean peninsula remains a 
fantasy.  
 
A Policy of Compromise: The Origins of the Sunshine Policy 
 From a constructivist perspective, it is imperative to examine the systematic factors that 
limit and enable the agency of all actors, and critically examine actors’ actions defying their 
 
11 Ibid.  
12 Karen Yourish and Gregor Aisch, “The Top Jobs in Trump’s Administration are Mostly Vacant: Who’s to 
Blame?,” The New York Times, published on July 20, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-appointments.html.  
 
 systematic constraints. In the case of the Korean unification policy, the constraint was evident 
through economic crisis, leading to a restructuring by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).13 
Until 1996, the Republic of Korea was the model for economic success in East Asia. Its strategy 
of state-led growth created an average GDP growth of 8% per annum, and a corresponding average 
increase in wages of 7%. However, by 1997, a decade of ill-advised financial liberalization14 
heavily fueled by short-term loans from foreign banks, created an investment-led boom. During 
the Asian Tiger Crisis in 1997, foreign banks demanded an immediate repayment of loans. Without 
the liquid assets required to affect such a repayment, many Korean firms and banks were near the 
brink of defaulting on their loans.15 As was the case throughout the region during the Asian Tiger 
crisis, the IMF was soon to offer a restructuring program to the Republic of Korea. Ever the 
reformist, Kim Dae-jung welcomed IMF restructuring with open arms, and such a program began 
in December 1997. The IMF immediately ordered that massive macroeconomic austerity measures 
be undertaken, including a 30% interest-rate hike. The effect on the economy was felt immediately; 
GDP growth plummeted, and unemployment skyrocketed.16 Part of the austerity measures enacted 
by the Republic of Korea included cuts to the defence budget.17 Constrained by the IMF 
restructuring, it was necessary for Kim Dae-jung to rethink South Korean policy towards the 
 
13 Paik, “Assessment of the Sunshine Policy: A Korean Perspective,” 17. 
14 James Crotty and Lee Kang-Kook, “A Political-economic Analysis of the Failure of Neo-liberal Restructuring in 
Post-crisis Korea,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 26, no. 5 (2002): 668: Buckling to pressure from foreign firms 
seeking a share in the Korean ‘miracle’, and family owned conglomerates (chaebol), the South Korean government 
liberalized markets by ending the longtime practice of controlling chaebol investment decisions, deregulated 
markets, and liberalized capital flows.  
15 Ibid. 
16 The unemployment rate in the Republic of Korea rose from 2.7% in 1997 to 6.96% in 1999: see “South Korea 
Unemployment rate,” TheGlobalEconomy.com, Accessed September 25, 2017, 
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/South-Korea/Unemployment_rate/.  
17 Between 1997 and 2004, the Korean defence budget fell from 2.663% of GDP to 2.331%: “Military expenditure 
(% of GDP),” The World Bank, Accessed September 25, 2017,  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2016&locations=KR&start=1960&view=chart.  
 DPRK. The result of financial constraints on the Korean military was a new policy of 
reconciliation, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence with the North.18  
 Parallel to the constraints of IMF restructuring was an increase of tension on the peninsula 
from two significant events in 1998. First, the Rumsfeld Commission outlined secret plans by the 
DPRK to develop an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the Taepo Dong 2, in July 1998.19 
The second event was the firing of the Taepo Dong 2 over the Sea of Japan in September 1998.20 
While these events would normally result in an increase of military tensions, President Kim Dae-
jung viewed these events as an opportunity to reform the inter-Korean relationship. Thus, it was 
this air of reform that led to a resumption of dialogue between the peninsula’s two regimes in 
2000.21  
After seven years during which the two regimes suspended diplomatic relations, a historic 
Inter-Korean Summit took place in Pyongyang in June 2000 and was personally attended by both 
heads of state. The two nations are technically still in a state of war, therefore this move displayed 
a great deal of trust on the part of Kim Dae-jung.22 It was through these talks that the electoral 
promise of dialogue would become realized, surmised in five main efforts outlined in the North-
South Joint Declaration on June 15, 2000. The document first affirmed both parties’ commitment 
to reunification of the peninsula through peaceful means; second, the parties agreed on the 
similarity of the future political systems sought by both the North and South, confederation, and 
 
18 Paik, “Assessment of the Sunshine Policy: A Korean Perspective.” 
19 United States, Congress and House Committee on National Security, Findings and Conclusions of the 
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States: Hearing before the Committee on National 
Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress: Second Session, Hearing Held July 16, 1998 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 9. 
20 Sheryl Wudunn, “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory,” The New York Times, published 
September 1, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/01/world/north-korea-fires-missile-over-japanese-
territory.html.  
21 Chung-in Moon, “The Kim Dae Jung Government’s Peace Policy Towards North Korea,” Asian Perspective, 25, 
no. 2 (2001): 178-179. 
22 Ibid, 178. 
 federalism respectively. Third, the document commits to family reunification; fourth, to the 
promotion of economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. Finally, the Declaration commits both 
nations to begin a dialogue.23  
While the declaration calls on both nations to reduce tensions and outlines a format for 
dialogue to begin, it does not diminish the military rivalry between both nations. The Korean 
peninsula continues to be locked in a classical security dilemma. Both nations perceive the other 
as a threat, and therefore procure advanced conventional arms, such as Aegis equipped Guided 
Missile Destroyers, and keep large standing armies. The militaries of both nations combined 
exceed 1.8 million service members.24 Therefore, it can be observed that the Sunshine Policy is 
not a complete break from the established foreign policy of the Republic of Korea, rather, it 
expands the total options available to pressure the North. The Kim government did not surrender 
its powerful deterrent against the North, which is a vital force for maintaining the status quo on 
the peninsula. Deterrence can be described as peacekeeping, and is pursued through two main 
efforts; first, the indigenous military capabilities of the Republic of Korea, and secondly, the large 
military presence of the United States on the peninsula.25 The efforts of the Sunshine Policy can 
therefore be described as peacemaking; transforming the relationship into one that is more peaceful 
through diplomatic means, such as arms control, and normalizing diplomatic relations. These 
efforts are fully realized as a peacebuilding process, or the crafting of a lasting peace without the 
need of large deterrence measures.26 Peacebuilding would require the Republic of Korea to exert 
pressure on the DPRK to change the structural factors leading to inter-Korean conflict, such as 
cracking the fortified Juche of the DPRK to introduce market reforms, including commercial 
 
23 Ibid, 180. 
24 Ibid, 181.  
25 Ibid, 184.  
26 Ibid, 186. 
 relations, and membership in International Financial Organizations (IFOs), thereby normalizing 
the interactions of the DPRK with the international community.  
 
Solar Eclipse: The Death of The Sunshine Policy 
 The successive embattled liberal governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun fell in 
2008 to conservative Lee Myung-bak. The proposition of the Lee administration was that the 
Sunshine Policy had failed in its main objective; after ten years of openness with the North, the 
Sunshine Policy had failed to induce the North to reform itself into a normal state.27 The Lee 
government argued that unconditional and unilateral concessions to the North28 in fact 
strengthened its position domestically and internationally, and it failed to deter nuclear tests in 
2002 and 2006. Sunshine was successful in economic and cultural exchanges, as by 2008 more 
than 30 000 North Korean workers were employed in 70 South Korean firms and cooperation 
revitalized the North Korean tourism industry.29 However, the Kim and Roh governments were 
not successful in achieving the cited goals of reducing tensions along the Demilitarized Zone 
through a bilateral agreement to reduce the number of soldiers at the border. Additionally, they 
were unable to negotiate any agreements to dismantle the North’s nuclear program or build any 
significant confidence measures between the two regimes.  
 To respond to the perceived failure of Sunshine, the Lee government announced its 
unification policy, ‘Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness’, that would be goal-oriented and 
tied to reciprocal relaxation of tensions with the North. This policy placed the denuclearization of 
 
27Hong-Nack Kim, “The Lee Mung-Bak Government's North Korea Policy and the Prospects for Inter-Korean 
Relations,” International Journal of Korean Studies XII, no. 1 (2008): 2. 
28 Ibid, 3: By 2008, the South had provided the North with $3.5 billion in assistance. 
29 Ibid, 3-4: Hyundai Asan invested in the Mt. Kumhang Tourism Project in North Korea, which boasted 30,000 
visits per month by 2008. 
 the North as the single most important objective in inter-Korean relations, and Vision 3000 does 
not place dialogue as mandatory in inter-Korean relations.30 While many economic cooperation 
policies were continued in principle, an element of reciprocity was introduced in its practice. The 
Lee government proclaimed that humanitarian aid would only be provided to the North with 
assurances that it would repatriate South Korean Prisoners of War and commit to family 
reunification. Further, economic development would continue with the ambitious goal to raise the 
North’s GNI in ten years,31 through pressuring it to transition into a market-based export economy. 
The Lee government’s Vision 3000 plan also included securing international development funds 
from IFOs and ambitious infrastructure investments.32 Although these measures may resemble 
those of the Sunshine Policy in their appearance of openness and corporation, the underlying 
theories and motivations have changed. While the Sunshine Policy conceived of the unification of 
the two Koreas as a process achieved only through the long process of deliberate diplomacy and 
trust building measures, Vision 3000 conceives of unification as sound investment strategy - stated 
explicitly by the Lee government in its outlining of Vision 3000.33  
 Vision 3000 portrayed the North Korean nuclear weapons program as an existential threat 
to the Republic of Korea, and drew on the proposition that the Kim dynasty is irrational, or in a 
situation of desperation.34 However, David C. Kang argues authoritatively that the weapons 
program in the North is a matter of state-survival rather than of aggressive motivations. A common 
 
30 Kim, “The Lee Mung-Bak Government's North Korea Policy and the Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations.” 
31 Ibid, 8: The 2005 GNI of the DPRK was $650, and the Lee government’s plan proposed to raise that figure to 
$3000 in ten years. The plan called for the development of several free trade areas in the North, and the 
establishment of science and technology institutions in North Korea for the purpose of training 300,000 
professionals. 
32 Ibid, 9: Vision 3000 included plans by the Lee government to secure $40 billion in funds from the IMF, WBG, 
and Inter-Korean Cooperation fund, as well as making investments in a new inter-Korean railroad, “Seoul-Sinuiju,” 
communications networks, and infrastructure including ports, railways, and highways.  
33 Ibid. 
34 David C. Kang, “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War,” International Studies Quarterly 47, 
no. 3 (2003):301-324. 
 assertion levelled at the North is that its leadership is irrational and if its situation becomes dire, it 
is likely to use force to rebalance the status quo on the peninsula. Theories typically imagine the 
South as a stalwart defender while the North is a rogue challenger to the established order. Even 
theorists who imagine the Northern leadership to be rational envision that it is conceivable for the 
DPRK to rationally initiate war in a ‘desperation’ scenario - under which the North initiates 
hostilities with the South because the status quo is less preferable than the potential disasters 
potentially caused by open conflict.35  
 
North Korea and the Melian Dialogue: What if Melos could Nuke Athens? 
 The question of North Korea’s nuclear weapons goes right to the heart of the Melian 
Dialogue. While a myopic analysis of the classical Grecian work focuses on that infamous phrase 
uttered in negotiation with the people of Melos, “This is the safe rule - to stand up to one’s equals, 
to behave with deference to one’s superiors, and treat one’s inferiors with moderation,”36 what is 
often missing from discussions of the Melian dialogue is its context, and its applicability to the 
political situation on the Korean peninsula.  
In the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides and a delegation of Athenians arrive on the Island 
of Melos to demand tribute from the Melians to Athens. Melos, a colony of Sparta, had not 
followed its neighbours in the Aegean Sea, the majority of whom entered into a tributary 
relationship with Athens. In negotiations, the Melians demand the principles of ‘fair play’ and ‘just 
dealing’, and the Athenians respond that those who preserve their independence do so because 
they are strong. The Melian Dialogue presents the issue of sovereignty, the right of Melos to 
 
35 Ibid. 
36 Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War,” Chapter XVII, Mount Holyoke College, Accessed September 
29, 2017, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm. 
 determine its foreign relations for itself, and to be free to manage its affairs without intervention 
from either of the classical hegemons – Athens and Sparta. The Melian dialogue ends with Athens 
laying siege to Melos; and although the Melians are initially successful in countering the siege, the 
Athenian lines are quickly reinforced, and Melos overrun by Athens. The dialogue closes with 
Thucydides recounting the punishment for Melos’ defiance; after surrendering unconditionally, all 
Melian men of military age were executed, the women and children were sold as slaves, and the 
remainder of the city became a colony of Athens.37 The lessons of the Melian dialogue for the 
DPRK are clear - exercising one’s sovereignty can be a dangerous exercise in brinkmanship for a 
state rivalling nearby hegemonic powers. Most telling in the Melian Dialogue is the justification 
for the Athenians intervening in the affairs of Melos,  
“We are not so much frightened of states on the continent. They have their 
liberty, and this means that it will be a long time before they begin to take 
precautions against us. We are more concerned about islanders like yourselves, 
who are still unsubdued, or subjects who have already become embittered by the 
constraint which our empire imposes on them.”38 
In short, the Athenians are concerned by the proximity of the Melians to their empire, for 
the Athenians are the hegemonic power of the Aegean Sea. The Melians are subject to the imperial 
dictates of the Athenians because they are within their sphere of influence. While nations outside 
of Athenian influence, or those within the spheres of other hegemonic nations are not subject to 
the whims of Athens, the Melians, as a free city in the Aegean Sea, lose their ability to contravene 
their neighbourhood hegemon. Melos is therefore threatened not only by relative power, but also 
by its proximity relative to a hegemonic power.  
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
 North Korea is in a much more dangerous neighbourhood, as it shares a border with the 
burgeoning People’s Republic of China, but also lies under threat of the United States, the world’s 
undisputed superpower since 1945. In order to abate the threat posed to the regime by the 
competing interests of the two rival powers, the North has adopted an inward looking ideology 
known as Juche, postured as Kim Il-sung’s contribution to revolutionary thought.39 The ideology’s 
most complete conception, On the Juche Idea, was published under Kim Il-sung’s name in 1982, 
proclaiming that only through self-reliance can a nation achieve true socialism. Juche is marked 
by its emphasis on political independence (sovereignty, jaju), national economy (jarip), and self-
defence (jawi).40 As the example of the Melian dialogue clearly shows, the North’s ideology of 
self-reliance is a dangerous position to occupy. This is amplified given the relative power of the 
North Korean state against its rivals. Analyzing the most important statistics in international 
relations theory, GDP and defense spending, it is clear that the North is not able to compete with 
the South. By 2000, North Korean GNP had fallen to be less than 10% of South Korea, and per 
capita the ratio between the two nations fell to 5:1 in favour of the South.41 In terms of military 
spending, According to the US State Department’s World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 2016 report, the North spent a yearly average of US$3 Billion, while the South spent an 
average of US$30 Billion in the same period.  
Luckily for the North Koreans, weapons of war have advanced to a point that allows for an 
advantage to small nations. The potential firestorm that could be unleashed by munitions carrying 
a nuclear payload are devastating, and due to imperfect countermeasures, described in a US Joint 
 
39 Kim Il Sung, “On the Juche Idea,” Official Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Articles and Korean 
Friendship Association USA, 1982, http://www.korea-dpr.com/lib/Kim%20Jong%20Il%20-
%204/ON%20THE%20JUCHE%20IDEA.pdf.  
40 Ibid. 
41Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “The U.S. wants to stop North Korean missiles before they launch. That may not 
be a great idea,” The Washington Post, published March 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/03/15/the-u-s-wants-to-stop-north-korean-missiles-before-they-launch-that-may-not-be-a-great-idea/.  
 Chief of Staff report as ‘trying to hit a bullet with a bullet’ and counter-countermeasures42, defense 
against nuclear attack is very difficult. These structural constraints render the prospect of winning 
a nuclear war meaningless. However, it is possible for a state possessing nuclear weapons to 
manipulate the risk associated with nuclear war. Players are therefore engaged in a game of 
brinksmanship on the assumption that the other player will defer before nuclear hostilities 
commence. Nuclear brinksmanship is a game of ‘chicken’, and the price paid by players engaged 
in a game of nuclear chicken has the potential to end in disaster. However, successfully 
manipulating the game of nuclear brinksmanship has an incredibly deterring effect on players 
opposed to states engaging in nuclear brinksmanship. When the North makes bellicose statements 
such as those it made in August 2017 threatening to test nuclear weapons off the coast of Guam,43 
the purpose of these statements is to manipulate the risk associated with the North’s nuclear 
arsenal, and disincentivize any meaningful response from the United States. 
The images of the Kim regime in Pyongyang that circulate the popular media portray the 
actions of the regime in either a satirical or irrational light. The underlying narrative of this 
assumption is that the North is committed to achieving its goals in a way that defies normative 
cost/benefit analysis. The calculations contributing to actions taken by the regime towards the 
North’s goal of unification can be summed thusly; the value attributed to the goal, the costs of 
attaining the goal, and the probability of success. In order to take action, the regime would have to 
value all calculations very highly, however as shown previously, the North is highly imbalanced 
against the South in terms of economic output, military spending, and military transfers from 
sponsor states. A rational actor would therefore conclude that military action taken towards 
 
42 Ibid: Counter-counter measures are designed to limit the possibility that a missile once launched will be able to 
deliver its payload to its intended target. Examples include use of decoys; multiple warheads and missile volleys.  
43 Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Says it Might Fire Missiles into Waters Near Guam,” The New York Times, 
published August 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-guam.html.  
 reunification is ill-advised, and it can be asserted that the North has made this calculation as 
evidenced by the lasting peace on the peninsula.44 North Korea is rational because although it 
highly values unification, it is restrained by a calculation that success is unlikely, and the risk 
associated is too high.  
Insights into the Pyongyang’s motives can be taken directly from the North’s publicly 
released statements justifying its proliferation. North Korea has said in statements that,  
“History proves that powerful nuclear deterrence serves as the strongest 
treasured sword for frustrating outsiders' aggression. [...] The Saddam Hussein 
regime in Iraq and the Gaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of 
destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development 
and giving up nuclear programmes of their own accord.”45 
Libya, which buckled to pressure and dismantled its nuclear programme in 2003, faced a 
western sponsored rebellion in 2011 that ultimately led to the decapitation of that regime.46 
While limited-war options seen during the Libyan campaign were possible before the 
DPRK developed a nuclear capability, such as pre-emptive strikes against nuclear facilities 
or decapitation operations against the regime’s leadership, such options are now 
unattractive due to the potential massive cost. The Republic of Korea and the United States 
are now faced with an unattractive but unavoidable reality - a nuclear Korean peninsula. 
However, feeling abandoned by its allies in Moscow and Beijing, and continued hostilities 
 
44  Kang, “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War,” 301-324. 
45 Stephen Evans, “The Saddam Factor in North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy,” BBC World Service, published 
September 9, 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37321686.  
46 Edward Chang, “North Korea has Nuclear Weapons so it Won’t End Up Like Libya,” The National Interest, 
published April 6, 2017. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-has-nuclear-weapons-so-it-wont-end-libya-
20060.  
 from its adversaries in Tokyo and Washington, the DPRK chose to develop nuclear 
weapons as a matter of state survival. 
 
The Road Forward: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Bomb 
 Perhaps the current security dilemma could have been avoided if certain steps were taken. 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States neglected to follow the example of the Russian 
Federation and People’s Republic of China’s normalization of relations with the Republic of 
Korea, by normalizing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.47 This would 
have presented an excellent opportunity to work multilaterally with the Republic of Korea during 
the Kim Dae-jung administration’s initial push for the normalization of relations. Instead, the 
United States insisted that any normalization of relations or negotiated end to the Korean War be 
impinged upon a negotiated path to complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID).48 
Much like the conservative administrations in the Republic of Korea, the United States sees the 
cessation of proliferation as a precondition rather than a goal, and as a singular event rather than a 
process. The normalization of relations is not an endorsement of the actions of any state, rather it 
is an acceptance of the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a nation-state with 
a functioning government.49 The normalization of relations with North Korea is important for two 
reasons; assuring the Kim regime that the United States is not committed to regime change, and 
increasing the diplomatic arsenal available to the ROK and the United States to effect the goal of 
continued peace on the peninsula as expressed by all parties. 
 
47 David Lai and Alyssa Blair, “How to Live with a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2017, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/how-to-learn-to-live-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
 While the claim is often made that diplomatic efforts have been tried and been 
unsuccessful, they fail to mention that past diplomatic efforts have been singularly focused on the 
issue of disarmament and have not been part of a larger peace process addressing the structural 
concerns of the Kim regime in Pyongyang. On 18 September 2017, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe wrote a powerful editorial for the New York Times, outlining what he sees as a dire 
situation, in which the DPRK has systematically rebuked the non-proliferation regime, by 
withdrawing from both the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, in 2003 and 2002, respectively.50 Abe argues that the international community acted with 
solidarity in addressing the threat posed by proliferation, through the Six-Party Talks (China, 
Russia, Japan, the United States, and North and South Korea) in attempting to persuade North 
Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions.51  
Prime Minister Abe fails to mention that these talks were predicated upon the North 
abandoning its program without any concessions made to the North in order to address the root 
causes of North Korean proliferation. Prime Minister Abe argues that the DPRK would view any 
attempt at further diplomacy as “proof that other countries succumbed to the success of its missile 
launches and nuclear tests”,52 and therefore humiliate the West and embolden North Korea. 
However, there has been no attempt at negotiating a solution to proliferation and none have been 
proposed. 
 On 10 May 2017, Moon Jae-in was sworn in as President of the Republic of Korea. A 
human rights lawyer and former Chief of Staff for Democratic President Roh Moo-hyun, Moon 
was elected on a promise to revive some keystone policies of the Sunshine Policy and notably 
 
50 Shinzo Abe, “Shinzo Abe: Solidarity Against the North Korean Threat,” The New York Times, September 17, 
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 nominated some key architects of the Policy to cabinet, such as Suh Hoon, the architect of the two 
Inter-Korean summits, who President Moon has chosen to head the National Intelligence Service.53 
President Moon, like his Democratic predecessors, understands that the ultimate risk of continuing 
the sanctions regime and military posturing against the North is a nuclear tragedy on the Korean 
peninsula, in a horrific end to the game of nuclear chicken currently taking place. Therefore, 
President Moon has advocated for a policy of re-engaging in diplomacy with the North, but despite 
this change in policy, also sees the necessity of a military deterrent.54 Unlike his predecessors, 
President Moon contends that while maintaining a deterrent and sanctions regime is important to 
pressure the North, the road to a lasting peace is through dialogue.55 However, despite the 
arguments of Joshua Stanton, Sung-Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner, that a return to the Sunshine 
Policy means a turn to appeasement of the Kim regime,56 the Republic of Korea has maintained a 
strong military deterrent. 
Since Moon Jae-in’s inauguration, the ROK has participated in bilateral exercises with the 
United States, some of the largest of their kind, involving 7,500 American soldiers, and 50,000 
South Korean troops, exercising the country's emergency response to conventional, asymmetric, 
and nuclear threats.57 Further, the ROK has announced what it calls a ‘decapitation unit’, which it 
has publicly stated could be used to conduct cross-border raids against the leadership of the Kim 
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 regime.58 President Moon has pledged to increase military spending to 2.9% of GDP, from 2.4% 
left by the previous conservative government,59 which includes three arms-build up plans, Kill 
Chain; the Korea Air and Missile Defense program, and; the Korea Massive Punishment and 
Retaliation Initiative, designed to preemptively strike missile launches, missile interceptors, and 
short-range ballistic missiles, respectively.60 Evidently, the claims of the Sunshine Policy’s 
detractors do not hold water against the reality of Moon Jae-in’s policies. Further, deterrence does 
not preclude the possibility of limited, defensive engagements against aggression from the North, 
such as those taken in retaliation for the North Korean Navy crossing the Northern Limit Line in 
1999 and 2002. The Republic of Korea Navy responded with force, killing dozens of DPRK 
sailors.61 To contrast this with a conservative administration, the Lee Myung-bak administration 
failed to respond effectively to the 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette, merely issuing verbal 
denunciations.62  
 The underlying fault of the conservative vision of unification policy is that it cedes the 
status quo to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. When Stanton et. al write that 
“Washington must threaten the one thing that Pyongyang values more than its nuclear weapons: 
its survival”63 they are ceding to the Kim regime the guarantee of the survival of their oppressive 
and totalitarian regime. The fundamental assertion of the Sunshine Policy is that the status quo is 
not acceptable and maintains the dream of Korean unification. However, while some in the current 
American administration may see this as only possible through the use of military force on the 
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 peninsula, the Sunshine Policy is confident in the superiority of its ideals. While Vision 3000 made 
aid and economic exchanges conditional and reciprocal, the Sunshine Policy understands that the 
Liberal ideals of South Korea have brought it freedom, prosperity, and abundance. Showcasing 
Liberal ideals to the North is a powerful enough weapon to shake the regime to its core. A powerful 
example of the destabilizing impact that the Sunshine Policy had on North Korea is the moon 
shaped Choco Pie. North Korean workers on exchange in South Korea were increasingly exposed 
to artifacts of South Korean wealth, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex began distributing Choco 
Pies to their workers.64 These pies in turn became so popular that workers stopped eating all of 
their Choco Pies, and many made their way back into North Korea to be sold in the country’s large 
markets.65  
The impact of exposure to Choco Pies and other artifacts of South Korean culture was 
immediate. By 2001, one year after the start of the program at Kaesong, the number of defectors 
spiked to more than 500, and to more than 2000 by 2002.66 More than any ballistic missile program 
or armed resistance to North Korean proliferation, the Choco Pie and South Korean cultural objects 
may be one of the most effective weapons at the disposal of Moon Jae-in. The Kim regime, 
although tolerating the sale of Choco Pies at the country’s markets, has pressured the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex to cease distributing the treats to its North Korean workers as part of their 
compensation package.67 However, the Kim regime is dependent on the revenue generated by its 
overseas workers. Numbering as many as 100 000, they generate up to US$2.3 billion for the 
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 country,68 therefore the DPRK is at a disadvantage when fighting Choco Pie distribution. These 
weapons are powerful not for their destructive power, but for the destabilizing effect they have on 
the Kim regime. In each Choco Pie is contained a promise, that a better life is within reach, and 
the only obstacle is the Kim dynasty. If the West truly believes in its Liberal ideals, then it is 
necessary to showcase them confidently, and show the oppressed North Korean people that better 
is truly possible.  
 
 
Conclusion: The Sunshine Policy vs Fire & Fury 
 On September 20th, 2017, President Donald Trump outlined an ultimatum to the regime in 
Pyongyang (or, as he dubbed North Korean leader Kim Jong-un -‘Rocket Man’), either 
denuclearize, or ‘we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea’.69 While the President 
is perhaps the most extreme iteration of this policy, the basic premise has been argued by many 
before him, including every American administration since President Clinton, as well as the 
Conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye in the Republic of Korea. The 
assumptions of these governments is thus; the North Korean regime is irrational, and seeks to 
reunify the Korean peninsula through violent subversion of their southern neighbour and their 
Western allies, Japan and the United States. They argue that diplomacy with a rogue nation as such 
cannot be possible, as doing so would embolden the regime and strengthen their convictions to 
rebuke international law.  
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 This paper has examined the North Korean security dilemma from a constructivist 
perspective and argues that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is locked in a Melian 
dilemma. With no negotiated settlement to the Korean War and absent normal diplomatic relations 
with the United States, the survival of the regime is not guaranteed. The ideological and 
geopolitical allies of the DPRK, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, have 
established normal relations with the Republic of Korea. Further, the Chinese have an entrenched 
and normalized relationship with the United States, and the threat of war on the Korean Peninsula 
is disadvantageous to the Chinese, whose primary goal in the crisis is stability.70 War would bring 
refugees, North Korean soldiers, and possibly radiation over the Yalu and Tumen rivers, which 
has led many power brokers in Beijing to question the long-held alliance with the North Korean 
regime.71 These factors have led to a security dilemma in Pyongyang, whereby their survival is not 
guaranteed. The spiritual successors to Melos, the North Koreans have fully embraced Thucydides 
eternal words to “[..] stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference to one’s superiors, and 
treat one’s inferiors with moderation”.72 
 The only guarantor to state survival for the North Korean regime is the development of 
nuclear weapons. If the regime in Pyongyang was committed to a violent reunification of the 
peninsula, they are more disadvantaged than at any time in their history. The Kim Il-sung 
government in the 1960s had the largest relative military strength compared to the South.73 Since 
then, the Chaebol system in South Korea has meant that the economic and military might of the 
ROK has far surpassed the North, with indigenous South Korean expenditures being tenfold that 
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 of the North by 2017. Supporting the perspective that Northern proliferation is defensive in nature 
is Dr. Jon Lindsay's piece, which clearly outlines that the purpose of nuclear armaments is not their 
destructive power, but rather the political posturing that leveraging nuclear weapons allows. 
Acknowledging the rational choices made by the North Korean regime, a major pillar of Vision 
3000 and much of the world’s reaction to the North Korean crisis are puzzling. The future of a 
nuclear Korean peninsula is no longer a potentiality, but rather now an unavoidable fact of life. 
Therefore, a well-thought out unification policy can no longer be impinged upon a denuclearized 
Korean peninsula.  
In order to avoid a ruinous reignition of hostilities, any unification policy must be focused 
on attacking the underlying systemic issues that have given rise to the security dilemma in 
Pyongyang. The only precedent for such a policy is the Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung 
government, which sought to maintain a powerful military deterrent against the North, while 
negotiating a settlement of the Korean War with the DPRK. While many detractors decry this 
policy as a symbol of weakness and appeasement of the totalitarian Kim regime due to its inception 
as a result of an IMF restructuring program, the Policy first and foremost created stability on the 
peninsula. When surveyed in 2000, four years after the beginning of the Sunshine Policy, 77% of 
respondents viewed the program favourably, with a de-escalation of military tensions as the most 
cited reason.74  
The Sunshine Policy was unique in that it did not cede any ground to the Kim regime. 
While Vision 3000 and American policies are complacent with North Korea as long as it is non-
nuclear, the Sunshine Policy is committed to meaningful unification. Through direct negotiation 
in the unprecedented Inter-Korean summit in 2000, as well as cultural and economic exchanges, 
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 the Sunshine Policy proudly commits the Republic of Korea to a project of unification under 
Liberal democracy. As demonstrated by the introduction of Choco Pies (an unlikely ally in 
International Relations) to North Korean workers in Kaesong Industrial Complex, simple artifacts 
of life in South Korea showcase the superiority of Western ideas, shaking the Kim regime to its 
core. While ten years of the Sunshine Policy failed to prevent proliferation, it led to a reduction in 
tensions, and the beginning of normal relations. Kim Dae-jung once said that “[the Sunshine 
Policy] requires courage and perseverance as well as faithfulness and wisdom”,75 and these are 
needed to solve the crisis on the peninsula. The solution lies in removing the need for proliferation, 
by assuring the North that the United States is not committed to regime change, normalizing 
relations, and officially ending the Korean War. Although this is not a politically palatable 
solution, Ronald Reagan once said, “There are no easy answers, but there are simple answers. We 
must have the courage to do what we know is morally right.”76  
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